ALFRED S. KONEFSKY
Though I corresponded with Willard Hurst over the last twenty-five years, I met him only once. Hurst did not often attend events or meetings outside of Madison,' but in 1971 he appeared at a legal history conference at the Harvard Law School to herald the renaissance in the field of American legal history, a renewal in many ways directly traceable to Hurst's own work and influence. I had just graduated from law school and was beginning my apprenticeship as a legal historian. With great trepidation I walked up to him to introduce myself at a reception on the first day of the conference. I was surprised when he seemed to recognize my name (I think a list of conference participants may have been circulated in advance), but even more astonished when he said, "Let's go find a quiet comer, I want to talk to you about your father." My father, Samuel J. Konefsky, had died less than a year before, and Hurst's brief conversation with me was the first of the many kindnesses of his that I experienced.
In any appreciation of Hurst's work, some mention must be made of his body of unpublished work-that is, through the medium of his correspondence, his constant and unflagging encouragement of the work of younger legal historians. Most of us experienced Hurst's kindness through the mail. Hurst's letters to colleagues were legendary for a variety of reasons. First, there was his typing. Let's just say it was engagingly erratic and that over time it got worse. It only made me look forward even more to his letters. Somehow the letters seemed more endearing, charming, and useful because of the personal effort that went into them. Second, there was that venerable, old typewriter on which Hurst obviously hammered out his correspondence himself. I have Hurst's letters to my father in the 1950s and 1960s, and Hurst's letters to me in the 1970s through the 1990s and, though I am hardly an FBI expert on the subject, it certainly looks like all of them were typed on the same typewriter, a machine that probably belongs in the Smithsonian to commemorate the impact it had on the writing of American history, particularly the history of American law. ' Finally, there are the letters themselves. Though I am sure that there must be surviving letters on general historiographical and theoretical subjects, most of the correspondence I know of can be placed into two general categories when Hurst responded to manuscripts and reprints that people sent to him. As far as I can tell, Hurst responded to everything that was sent to him. I think it fell under his definition of good Athenian citizenship or of being a gentleman-a dying if not lost art in today's academic culture. He took the occasion to encourage and support the work of everyone in a thoughtful and analytical way. If you sent him a manuscript, you often received in return a long letter with detailed comments carefully walking you through your evidence and arguments, incredibly detailed, probing, and thorough. I believe this technique may have been a product of Hurst's Harvard Law Review editorial experience. If you sent him a reprint of an already published piece, you got back a shorter letter (it usually seemed by return mail-I don't know where he got the time) that was organized into two parts. The first part repeated the real "holding" of the article (what you were driving at, but were afraid nobody would notice), thereby reassuring you that somebody out there actually understood and appreciated what you were trying to do. The second part of the letter posed an absolutely disarming and acute question about the article, demonstrating that you had not buried all the bones as successfully as you had hoped. The letter concluded with encouragement and praise-and a reminder to keep producing. 3 With Hurst's reputation for being helpful already well established by the early 1950s, it is not surprising that when my father, then a young assistant professor of political science at Brooklyn College, began working on 2. Needless to say, I am not the first to notice the typewriter. See, e.g., Aviam Soifer, "In Retrospect: Willard Hurst, Consensus History, and notebooks, they were not recorded in shorthand, which my mother did not know. Instead she wrote in longhand or cursive, primarily in sentence fragments, skipping words and omitting punctuation as she attempted to keep pace with the rapid flow of ideas. Yet the interview notes help us imagine the voice of Willard Hurst. It helped a lot, I think, that she was very familiar with the ideas being discussed as a result of her own graduate education (cut short to devote herself to helping my father) and her years spent as a reader for him. My mother generally described these interviews more as pleasant "conversations" and dialogues than as a formal series of questions and answers. My father seemed to ask very few questions-only a few are identifiable, for instance, in his interview with Hurst Much more reserved in the freedom he allowed himself than other judges 1 Highly sophisticated-least naive 2 didn't regard himself as devoted to the adjudication of cases 3 In a practicing philo[sophy] = Court essentially a dramatic spectacledramatizing principles, value judgments-an educative function 16 . Riesman said of Brandeis that he "had no use for philosophy" and that he "was a bore, a barbarian, no classicist." Riesman Interview, 6.
17. Riesman reported that he was "aware of B's legend of holiness," and he intimated that he thought there was a "discrepancy" between the legend and reality. Ibid., 2.
18. Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen, The Nine Old Men (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran, 1937).
19. Riesman noted that Brandeis "was loyal to the team, might fight with them within but defended them outside." Riesman Interview, 7.
20. Riesman had reported that Brandeis "didn't want his clerks to fraternize with other clerks." Ibid., 4. Hurst-left to determine the bounds of his work by himself subject to the judge's acts B Didn't need a clerk-an educational experience Probably steered H into university teaching 21 . Riesman commented that Brandeis "didn't have an open mind, a great lawyer but not judge. All B's opinions are all ingenious briefs (they can't be trusted to report all the evidence)," and that he was "exceeding[ly] rigid, was gracious but wouldn't budge an inch, not open-minded." Ibid., 2, 4.
22. Riesman observed that Brandeis "never asked R for his opinion, just a leg man, his strategy even was all set. Would listen to R on point of style didn't like R's lack of legal ingenuity." Ibid., 4. 25. Riesman characterized Brandeis as having a "certain presumptuousness in pressing people (to be a pioneer)," and that in his case Brandeis "wanted him to go to pa minn or term and adamant against his going back to Boston." Riesman Interview, 3. Riesman still seemed to resent this years later. See Riesman, "Becoming an Academic Man," at 40.
26. Riesman seemed to suggest that Brandeis was an "enemy of the New Deal" because he was a "rabid decentralist." Riesman Interview, 1, and that he "was no Dem. or Liberal in the New Deal sense." Ibid., 5.
27. Riesman asserted that Brandeis "was against Soc[ial] Sec [urity] ." Ibid., 9. 28. Riesman observed that he had "watched" Brandeis "at Sunday teas draw people out," but that he was "incapable of genuine interest in people, just exploiting them. Should not be criticized because obviously he also exploited himself." Ibid., 2. Make a list of men accepted by the general public to think in a self-consciously directed fashion B an expression of the procedural side of his thinking-not the substantive.
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Hurst and the Democratic Process
Hurst granted a number of interviews during his lifetime that either focused on Brandeis or at least devoted some portion of the discussion to Brandeis. forts to improve a democratic process that would reflect more responsively the needs of the people whom the process is intended to serve. 38 Though I do not wish to walk the reader through the interview or suggest major organizing themes, I believe a number of clues emerge that reveal a good deal of what Hurst absorbed about Brandeis and applied in his own work. The importance of legislatures and state or local governments rather than courts as the center of the universe is apparent, as is as an insistence that legal ideas operate within a socioeconomic context. But most important is Hurst's emphasis on what he construed as Brandeis's stress on "facts." 3 9 The connection between (1) law broadly conceived beyond the work produced by judges deciding litigated cases, (2) law in society rather than law and society, and (3) the importance of establishing "facts" is illustrated by Hurst In New State Ice, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional an Oklahoma statute that required anyone seeking to enter the ice business in Oklahoma first to obtain a license from a state agency. In order to justify its regulation of access into the ice business (generally conceived to be within the realm of private enterprise), the legislature declared in the statute that the business was instead a public business, in other words "affected with" a public interest. Concerned about the anticompetitive, monopolistic implications of the law, the Supreme Court held that the statute violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Normally one would have expected Brandeis to be concerned about the fate of small entrepreneurs and to support a result that apparently would encourage competition that might benefit consumers. 42 But Brandeis had another concern here, what he termed "experimentation. ' economic problem, Brandeis could not understand why there should not "be power in the States and the Nation to remould, through experimentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and economic needs." 44 It was, he continued, "one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. 45 In explaining why "experiments" were necessary, Brandeis evoked some social realism, "[t]he long-continued depression," which left the nation "confronted with an emergency more serious than war." 46 Brandeis reminded the Court that "[m]isery is wide-spread" 47 and that "[s]ome people believe that the existing conditions threaten even the stability of the capitalistic system. '48 In searching for the causes and solutions of the economic crisis, Brandeis wanted to know why a state's proposal to address partially a potentially destabilizing problem of unregulated competition might not pass constitutional muster.
Brandeis thus suggested that constitutional law ought to engage social and economic reality within its scope. "Physical science" reveals "the value of the process of trial and error," he proclaimed. 49 Why could not similar experiments in the laboratories of state government or legal experience likewise yield valuable data and results? "Some people assert that our present plight is due, in part, to the limitations set by courts upon experimentation in the fields of social and economic science; and to the discouragement to which proposals for betterment there have been subjected otherwise. '5° Rejecting evidence gathered from these experiments-indeed obstructing the ability in a decentralized system to conduct the experiments in the first place-was particularly dangerous because " [m] an is weak and his judgment is at best fallible."'" Policy leaders informed with the results of experiments held the promise of making man's judgment less fallible. 44 Law could do better if it expanded its vision. On the other hand, a social 52. What resonates as well in Hurst's work is Brandeis's loving, and occasionally minute, attention to detail, to the facts. In his Ice dissent, "Brandeis quoted the mean normal temperature each month in Oklahoma, showing the need for ice; the dependence of industries and retail dealers on ice; the lack of refrigerators and their cost as against the lower cost of ice." Strum, Louis D. Brandeis, 302-3. In addition, "[a]t every major point, Brandeis cited a host of sources: thirty-seven books, articles, reports, scholarly papers, and congressional hearings." Ibid., 304. In other words, the "facts" were marshalled to support the argument that there was plenty of evidence to justify the state legislative activity. To secure social advance we must regard the field of sociology and social legislation as a field for discovery and invention. Research is necessary as in the field of science and invention, as in the field of mechanical and other arts. In the field of mechanical invention, as in other fields of human enterprise, the successes are few and the failures are many. 53. Quoted in Soifer, "In Retrospect," 127. Hurst also noted that while enrolled in a law school course on courts and mortgages, "the course never mentioned the idea of a mortgage moratorium, which was going on all over the United States .. " Hartog, "Snakes in Ireland," 372.
54. See above, 155.
vision of law needed to be tested because, according to Brandeis, "man is weak" and his judgment fallible at best. This is akin to Hurst's belief that "[p]eople are limited" and "that human beings are finite creatures, in that there are limits to what they can do and accomplish," ideas that he attributed to the influence of Brandeis and Reinhold Niebuhr 5 5 As a result of the fact that " [w] e are all limited in vision, ' 5 6 the risk is that a short-sighted pragmatism will emerge and govern our actions. In a letter of recommendation Hurst wrote to a foundation supporting my father's grant application for his Holmes and Brandeis book, Hurst noted, the two men ... reflect the strengths and limitations of pragmatic thinking.
Since, for better or worse, pragmatism seems the nearest we as a people are going to get to a decent working philosophy in our time, the issues involved here go right to the center of the question of the viability of our society. 7 The limits of pragmatism (obviously not necessarily an enemy of observation and experimentation) needed to be tested by investigating the actual factual reality or consequences of conscious or unconscious value choices made in society. Hurst identified the Brandeis contribution as "elevat[ing] the popular application of rational fact" in "an effort to establish premises." 58 Brandeis himself was explicit about the role of rationality in constitutional evaluations of social policy. He concluded his New State Ice dissent by declaring, "[ilf we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold." 5 9 Hurst internalized the message and learned from Brandeis the importance of rationality in the legal process-empirically verifying the conditions under which law functioned. Facts mattered.
It is tempting, of course, to place Hurst's role as a historian into categories reflecting the evolutionary patterns of the profession. Hurst's work contains the elements of a number of movements (and contradictions) in law as well as history-realist, reformer, empiricist, progressive historian, 55. Hartog, "Snakes in Ireland," 375-76. Hurst reported that Brandeis once talked to him "on the subject of Woodrow Wilson and his disastrous last period as president and the fight over the League of Nations, and Brandeis said he thought he'd always remember that as an historic example of the fact that a man shouldn't try to do too much, that there were limits to the human capacity to create and act." Ibid., 375.
56. Ibid., 389. consensus historian, economic determinist, materialist, economic liberal, social scientist, and so forth-all associated in some fashion with modernism, and not postmodernism. But I would like to suggest a way of looking at his thought that incorporates many of these categories in service or furtherance of another idea-faith (sorely tested) in a democratic vision. The connection is again made through Brandeis. My father wrote of Brandeis that he was a "social scientist with a conscience" and that "what mattered most was continued progress toward a better society. Whatever the issue-differentiation in the tax structure, the growth of chain stores and cooperatives, the basis for determining public utility rates-to all of these problems he brought the creative approach of one who cared deeply about the results of social arrangements. '60 Hurst similarly observed of Brandeis that his "skepticism of men's capacity to handle themselves well in the face of demands made by the great institutions they had set up, extended fully, I think, to government," and that he had "some conviction that the meaning of life ... lay in the effort to shape the formless and stubbornly resistant matter of general experience into patterns of understanding and of directed control in the interest of values that would enhance the worth of men." 6 1 This pursuit of "understanding" can be divided into two parts, one methodological or procedural, the other substantive. For Hurst, the question of how we arrive at "understanding" was directly related to our need for knowledge in order to strengthen society's ability to respond to people's concerns. The capacity to respond began with the process of determining exactly what had transpired historically. In describing this process, Hurst concluded that Brandeis found one road to the responsible use of power in a constant insistence that definition of ends and means be kept close to regular, realistic search for facts. Too sophisticated by far to fall victim to a naive empiricism, he sought always for a working philosophical frame for action. But the philosophy must likewise regularly be checked against experience. on fact (wanted never to be caught out on facts)," he was "[a] symbol of an effort to grapple with fact," his "contribution" was "to elevate the popular application of rational fact," and finally, that he "took oratory out of liberalism-too much wind-put fact in. '63 Over forty years later, Hurst was still speaking about facts, though no longer with the direct reference to Brandeis. In his talking with Dirk Hartog, Hurst commented, sometimes with frustration, about modern students' misunderstanding about the reasons for "recording the facts." More generally, he remarked that it is "a matter of fact," or "I think it's just the facts," or "it is an important social fact," or "just dealing with the facts," or finally, " [i] Because Brandeis "wanted never to be caught out on facts," the law clerks "found themselves spending endless hours in libraries," including "the Library of Congress, where they sought out the innumerable citations to sociological material that Brandeis demanded." Strum, Louis D. Brandeis, 355. Since, in particular, the Brandeis opinions "had always to be factually correct," it "was a burden the clerks carried." Ibid., 356. There seems to be no question that this Brandeis trait left an impression on Hurst. Strum reports that "[wihen counsel did not present all relevant facts, his clerks were expected to compensate for the deficiency." Ibid. Strum's source for this statement seems to be her interview with Hurst. Ibid., 470, n. 5.
64. Hartog, "Snakes in Ireland," 385, 386, 387, 390. Samuel Mermin, in discussing Hurst's penchant for facts, quotes a Holmes letter to Pollock in which Holmes good-naturedly reports being chided by Brandeis, "Why don't you try something new, study some domain of fact. Take up the textile industries in Massachusetts and after reading the reports sufficiently you can go to Lawrence and get a human notion of how it really is." Holmes's response to Pollock about Brandeis's suggestion was to observe laconically, "I hate facts." Mermin, "Thoughts on the Legendary Willard Hurst," 1158. Hurst does not seem too concerned about the postmodern skepticism that calls into question the objectivity or scientific reliability of observations or interpretations of "facts."
65. been made? We expose to a withering historical glare both the process by which those choices have been made and the results of those decisions. The inquiry has a moral tone or quality, revealing what has been good or bad. This is because so much is at stake in a democratic society in making arrangements that affect the well-being of all of us. Only after investigating the past are we capable of exercising meaningful democratic control of our lives to better our common lot.
Many of the common, recurring themes in Hurst's writing take on new meaning when seen through this lens. Hurst's indictment of "bastard pragmatism" '67 and "drift and default"-along with his focus on legislatures and problems of statutory interpretation-stemmed from his attempt to ensure that the democratic promise was fulfilled as a result of informed judgments about what would yield benefits to a people who had often not chosen to exercise sufficient power or control over their own destinies. How can we restore responsibility in the face of historical accounts of society's frequent abnegation, resignation, or failure to require public accountability in the face of unchecked private power that is selfish, insular, narrow, and, even worse, irrational?
Democracy, of course, has had different meanings at different times, as well as different meanings at the same time in different places. By the time that Brandeis and Hurst were thinking and writing about democracy, Tocqueville's vision of American democracy may have become nothing more than a quaint memory, though it may still have suggested a promise not yet fulfilled. Hurst's college focus on the work of the Progressive historian Charles Beard is instructive. 68 Hurst's interest in Beard at this formative moment in his career seems consistent with the obsession with social relations or social class in the work of early twentieth-century democratic theorists. The promise of democracy seemed to be primarily associated with equality; an increasingly stratified society nullified the goal of equality. Maldistribution of wealth enhanced hierarchy, inhibited the pursuit of equality, and frustrated the will of the relatively voiceless majority who, nevertheless, had a significant stake in the implications of democratic theory. History empirically demonstrated the consequences of the failure of government to provide democratic opportunity. To address the crisis caused by the growing evidence of inequality, democratic theory underwent a subtle shift, and began gradually emphasizing individual or group interests and identities rather than social class. This shift allowed a more effective expression of the ambiguity of countermajoritarian demands. It highlighted, in a different way, the paradoxes, dangers, and inconsistencies of continuing inequality in the face of a world of democratic goals. In the mid-twentieth century, with totalitarian fascism and communism lurking as competing systems of thought, America found it imperative to set freedom's house in order. 69 Hurst tried to help by pointing out that law's expression did not always reflect the promise of democracy. That promise was perceived as increasingly ambiguous and complex by the late twentieth century.
In Hurst's writing (as well as in Brandeis's), there is a tension, perhaps a legacy of Progressivism, between seeking a better future through informed democratic decision making and placing the responsibility for gathering the facts or evidence to advise citizens in the hands of a relatively few individual experts. The risk, of course, is that elites will have disproportionate, unregulated control or power over shaping people's beliefs. The Progressive response generally was that, in an increasingly complex society, expert opinion is needed to investigate social events and circumstances that are technical and that might no longer be susceptible to analysis by the general population. The purpose of seeking technocratic insights is to provide a means to the end of informed democratic judgments, not to substitute the will of elites for the popular will. Indeed, the popular will would be better informed as a result of the efforts of the experts. Brandeis seemed aware of the problem at an early stage when he wrote to Frankfurter: "I should have little faith... in a small group of men evolving a social system or important elements of such a system. We must rely upon all America... for our social inventions and discoveries; and the value of the inventions and alleged discoveries can best be tested by current public discussion." "On the other hand," he said, "it seems to me that a small group of able, disinterested, well-equipped men, who could give their time to criticism and discussion of legislative proposals, discouraging those which appear to be unsound, and aiding those that appear to be sound, would be of great assistance in the forward movement. 
